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Abstract 
 
This paper examines change in wage gaps in urban China by estimating quantile regressions on 
CHIPS data. It applies the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition, finding sharp increases in 
inequality from 1988 to 1995 and from 2002 to 2008 largely due to changes in the wage 
structure. The analysis reports how the returns to education and experience vary across wage 
quantiles, along with wage differentials by sex and party membership. The role of industrial 
structure, ownership reform and occupational change are also estimated. In the recent period, 
2002 to 2008, falls in the returns to education and experience have been equalising. However, 
changes in every other category of observed wage differential - by sex, occupation, ownership, 
industrial sector and province – have served to widened inequality. The gender gap continued 
to rise, as did the gap between white collar and blue collar workers, and between manufacturing 
and most other industrial sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Rising inequality is a serious concern for China. Over the last few decades, China has 
experienced soaring GDP growth but at the same time, widening income inequalities. Has 
China’s spectacular economic growth been partly at the expense of widening inequality? 
Conventionally, rising income inequality in transitional economies has been viewed as a 
necessary trade-off for increased efficiency, with pre-reform China emphasising an 
egalitarian distribution of earnings the expense of incentives and rewards for private initiative. 
Yet widening inequality may destabilise the economy – fostering socio-political discontent 
from the “losers” and thereby engendering instability.  
 
While the big picture of rising income inequality at the national level has been widely 
observed, a more in-depth and differentiated analysis of the contributors to income inequality 
across all income cohorts over time has so far been lacking. For example, economic reform 
has seen a widening gender wage gap on average, has this affected low income earners more 
than their higher income counterparts? Similar questions could be addressed concerning other 
factors such as ownership, industrial sectors, and individual’s characteristics including 
education, occupation, seniority and party membership. Can income inequality be resulted in 
or reflecting such changes over time? Using quantile analysis on surveys of urban residents, 
this paper explores the answers covering the period between 1988 and 2008.  
 
Wage earnings are the main source of income for urban Chinese residents. Whether wage is 
equality distributed affects the nature of the Chinese labour market, and hence the scale and 
degree of socio-political discontent. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on wage differentials 
among urban residents as one aspect of income inequality. There has been a marked increase 
in wage inequality during the period. For example, the ratio of the average wage of the 
highest paid industry to that of the lowest paid one increased from 1.76 in 1990 to 4.88 in 
2005 (SCDR, 2007; Gu and Feng, 2008). Increasing wage differentials among urban 
residents have contributed to a national rise in inequality.  
 
This paper focuses on the period 1988 to 2008. The past two decades saw the change of 
Chinese central leaderships and along with it, changes in policies. There were several major 
policy changes during this period that are likely to have changed the wage structure in urban 
China. Towards the beginning of the period, increased managerial autonomy in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) led to a move away from institutionally determined wages and increased 
use of bonuses based on enterprise profitability. Following Deng Xiao-ping’s “southern tour” 
in 1992, there was a dramatic increase in the openness of the Chinese economy attracting 
foreign owned or joint venture firms, as well as exposing domestic firms to international 
competition as they entered export markets. Controls on rural-urban migration were relaxed 
at the same time and the number of rural urban migrants soared from 15 million in 1990 to 
145 million in 2009 (NSB, 2011). Although migrants were still segmented into specific 
occupations, there is likely to have been some increase in competition with urban residents 
for certain kinds of work (for example, low skilled retail or service occupations) (Appleton, et 
al. 2004). Falling profitability in the state owned sector led to radical urban reform in 1995, 
with a mass retrenchment programme1. While this increased urban unemployment, it did not 
prevent large rises in real wages for workers who retained their jobs (Appleton, et al. 2005). 
Throughout the period there has been a rise in the importance of privately enterprise, whether 
                                                        
1 To the end of 2003, the number of the retrenched workers reaches 28.18 million (the News Office of the State Council, 
2004). In other words, roughly one-fourth of the SOES workers were retrenched (Appleton, et al. 2002). 
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through new entry of privately owned firms or through changes in the ownership of state 
owned enterprises (for example, moving to mixed ownership by listing on the stock 
exchange). Under the leadership inaugurated in 2002, state monopoly in the certain profitable 
industries has been reinforced, and the private sector in general lost its competitive power. 
This was amplified with the global credit crunch that started in 2008 and reduced the demand 
for Chinese exports. The slowdown of China’s exports might have contributed to income 
equality in the policy environment where state controlled investment to rescue the economy 
was largely focused on infrastructure and a weak domestic demand for consumption.   
 
There have been many studies of earnings and inequality in China during this eventful period 
(see Appleton et al., 2005). However, most analysis of wages has used conventional 
regression analysis, implicitly focusing on wage differentials at the mean (or, since the 
dependent variable is typically the log wage, the median). This approach is rather inadequate 
since inequality depends on the entire distribution of wages – not merely what is happening 
to the middle of the distribution. Instead, this paper uses quantile analysis in order to map 
differentials across the entire distribution of wages. This approached, pioneered by Buchinsky 
(1994) for the US, has been used to track the evolution of wage structures in many different 
countries. Early applications to urban China have been conducted by Knight and Song (2002) 
and Bishop, Luo and Wang (2005). However, both these studies are restricted to comparing 
the urban labour markets in 1988 and 1995, based on the Chinese Household Income Project 
surveys (CHIPs). This paper goes further by extending the analysis to cover CHIPS data up to 
2008. Our paper is similar in objectives to a study by Xing and Li (2012), who look at 
residual wage inequality in China from 1995. We differ in starting from 1988 and by 
focussing on the Machado and Mata (2005) method, rather than the alternative DiNario et al. 
(1996) decomposition. A related study is Ge and Yang (2012), who use alternative data - the 
Chinese Urban Household Surveys - to analyse changes in China's wage structure from 1992 
to 2007. 
 
Using the results of quantile analysis of wage differentials in four rounds of CHIP surveys 
spanning twenty years, this paper formally decomposes changes in earnings inequality using 
the method of Machado and Mata (2005). This technique attributes changes in inequality into 
two broad sources. The first changes in the wage structure – the coefficients of the quantile 
regressions. The second is changes in the values of the variables determining earnings - i.e., 
workers’ personal and productive characteristics, and job characteristics. Within these two 
broad categories, the decomposition also quantifies the contribution of specific determinants 
of earnings – for example, education – to inequality. We can thus estimate the effect of 
changing returns to education and a changing stock of education on the gini coefficient for 
earnings in urban China. Similar estimates are provided for other factors such as experience, 
gender, Communist party membership, ethnicity, ownership sector, occupation and industrial 
sector. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the data and 
econometric methods. Sections 3 and 4 give the result of the quantile analysis and the 
decomposition of wage inequality respectively. Section 5 presents the summary and 
conclusions. 
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2. Data and Methods 
 
2.1 Data 
 
We use four rounds of the urban household survey data conducted as part of the China 
Household Income Project, covering the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2008. The surveys were 
national representative, and samples were randomly drawn from the larger annual national 
household income survey of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The questionnaires 
designed for the Household Income Project are more detailed than those in the official 
income surveys, particularly with respect to the measurement of income and labour issues. 
Our focus in this paper is on real wages, defined to include bonuses, price subsidies (which 
were important in 1988 before being largely withdrawn), regional allowances for working in 
mountainous areas, income in-kind, and income from secondary jobs.2 Results from the 
surveys are reported in Griffin and Zhao (1993), Riskin et al. (2001), Li and Sato (2006) and 
Gustafsson, et al. (2008).  
 
In most rounds, the CHIP surveys sampled only households with urban registration (hukou). 
Consequently, for comparability across rounds, we focus on only these households, excluding 
rural–urban migrant households because they are denied urban hukou status. Our results, 
therefore, are confined to that population group. For brevity, we often refer to urban wages 
when what is meant is the wages for registered urban residents. Analysing urban residents as 
a sub-group is defensible because administrative controls make it extremely difficult for 
people of rural origin to acquire an urban hukou so that any sample selection bias is likely to 
be negligible. Urban residents are likely to have been differentially affected by the loosening 
of controls over rural–urban migration in 1988 when the government allowed farmers to 
conduct business in cities, as Linge and Forbes (1990) discuss. Subsequent, rural–urban 
migration is likely to have had a moderating impact on the wages of urban residents having 
similar characteristics as, or working in similar sectors to, migrants. Hence, the effect is 
greater on urban workers with less education and those working in the service and 
commercial sectors.3 
 
Table 1 shows the general picture of a dramatic rise in inequality in urban wages from 1988 
to 2008. Figure 1 illustrates this graphically by plotting the Lorenz curves for the four years. 
It is hard to separate the two curves for 1995 and 2002, but curve for 1988 clearly dominates 
these curves, while these in turn dominate that for 2008. The gini coefficient – and all other 
rose indicators of inequality - sharply in the first interval, from 0.237 in 1988 to 0.345 in 
1995. It was largely unchanged in 2002, standing at 0.348, but then rose sharply again to 0.45 
in 2008. Thus over the twenty years, distribution of urban wages in China has gone from 
being relatively equal by international standards to being high. The 2008 estimate approaches 
levels as high as those reported for urban areas of Brazil in 2009 (Naticchioni and Cruz, 
2012). By comparison, the Gini coefficient for wages in the US in the same period only 
ranged in the mid to low 30s, depending on the data source used (Lerman, 1997). Insight into 
                                                        
2 Our wage variable, although fairly comprehensive, does exclude some non-monetary benefits such as pension accruals, 
health insurance and housing. The contributions of these variables may vary under differing forms of ownership and over 
time. Nominal wages were converted into real wages by deflating by regional urban CPIs. 
3 In the 1999 survey, the more settled migrants were surveyed and so we can compare their characteristics with those of 
workers with urban hukou (see Table 1 of Appleton et al., 2004). Over half the migrants were self-employed and so may not 
be directly competing for jobs with urban residents (only around 1% of whom were self-employed). Migrants tended to be 
less educated (averaging three fewer years of education), as well as including more young and male workers. Migrants’ 
distribution across jobs was very different from urban residents, with a large concentration being service or retail workers 
and relatively few working as highly skilled or industrial workers. 
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the details of rise in wage inequality during the period can be gained from the ratios of high 
and low wage percentile point values: for example, the ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile 
soared from 2.82 in 1988 to 6.43 in 2008.  
 
In modelling wages, our explanatory variables are divided into worker characteristics and job 
characteristics, with an additional set of dummy variables for provinces. Among the worker 
characteristics two conventional variables to capture human capital are identified as 
productive characteristics: education in years and years of experience, the latter being entered 
as a quadratic4. In addition, occupation has been employed as one of the explanatory variable 
in order to identify wage gaps between skilled professional and low skilled workers. Other 
worker characteristics – sex, Communist Party membership, non-Han Chinese ethnicity – are 
controlled for as non-productive characteristics as prima facie they do seem likely to directly 
affect productivity. It has been commonly hypothesised that the transition from a command 
economy to a market-oriented system will see a rise in the remuneration of productive 
characteristics and a fall in the importance of non-productive ones (Nee, 1989).  
 
Among job characteristics, we distinguish the ownership sector of the enterprise the worker is 
employed in (state owned enterprise, privately owned etc.). This is to identify changes of 
inequality between state-ownership and other ownership sectors. This is particularly 
important since the late 1990s when the state monopoly was put in place and further 
reinforced under the 2002 leadership. In this paper we also identify wage inequality and the 
changing trend among Chinese industrial sectors. We focus on manufacture sector which has 
been observed an important contributor to China’s exportation and map out the details of 
wage gaps cross quantiles and the changes over time in relation to other key industrial 
factors. . The means of our explanatory variables are given in Table 2, and our discussion of 
the trends is presented in Section 4. 
 
 
2.2 Method 
 
Let Qθ (wit|Xit) for θ(0,1) denote the θth quantile of the (log) wages w of an individual i in 
year t for given explanatory variables, X. For each year separately, we model these 
conditional quantiles by: 
 
 Q஘(ݓ୧୲ ⋮ X୧୲) = X୧୲′β୲(θ) (1) 
 
where β(θ) is a vector quantile coefficients and X is a vector of explanatory variables. The 
coefficients are estimated following Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) quantile regression 
estimator. In practice, we run a thousand quantile regressions with equally distanced quantile 
points for each round of the four rounds of cross-sectional data.5 Afterwards, we plot a curve 
for the 1000 coefficients on a given explanatory variable against the 1000 quantile points for 
each year (see Figures 1 to 20). From these curves we can observe the effect of the variable 
across the range of wage earners and over time. 
 
The quantile regression has a number of advantages over conventional ordinary least squares 
regressions. Most importantly, it provides a complete representation of the conditional 
distribution of wages whereas the conventional regression focuses only on the conditional 
                                                        
4 Potential experience is measured as age in years minus (years of schooling plus six). 
5 The distance between any two quantile points is 0.001. 
 8
mean 6 . This is particularly crucial for understanding inequality where the standard 
regression’s focus only on the central tendency is very limited. Furthermore, the quantile 
approach allows one to test whether some determinants of wages have different effects on 
workers higher up the conditional wage distribution than on those lower down. For example, 
we can see whether the returns to education vary at different points of the conditional wage 
distribution. The quantile approach recognises the unobserved heterogeneity of workers and 
thus allows a richer picture of the determinants of wages to be obtained.  
 
Some care must be taken in interpreting the results of the quantile analysis, because they 
pertain to conditional quantiles, not unconditional ones. Thus a worker at a high wage 
quantile would be one who has high wages given the values of observed determinants of 
wages, X, rather than a simply a high wage worker per se. Another way of saying this, is that 
a worker at high wage quantile will tend to have favourable unobserved determinants of 
wages. This form of words reveals the difficulty in interpreting the results. Since unobserved 
determinants of wages are unobserved, it is not clear exactly what they are. They could 
include measurement error, for example, or random factors (a worker’s good fortune in 
chancing upon a high paying position). However, there is some interest in these 
unobservables – for example, unobserved personal characteristics affecting earnings are often 
labelled “ability” in the theoretical literature (although they may also encompass 
determination, ambition and factors such as personal appearance). Often we have strong 
priors about how education will affect the earnings of workers of different ability. 
Unobserved characteristics of a job may also be interesting – for example, we do not observe 
firm size or profitability, but rent-sharing theories imply these may have significant effects on 
earnings. In our exposition, for brevity, when describing the patterns in our findings, we often 
refer to high quantiles unconditionally as representing high wage workers – as is common in 
the applied literature – but this is an over-simplification and the more nuanced interpretation 
focusing on unobservables is often invoked when trying to explain our results.  
 
From our estimates of equation (1) for different years, we can identify the change in the wage 
structure. This can then be used, following Machado and Mata’s (2005) method, to 
decompose changes in wage inequality into changes attributable to two sources. One is the 
change in the distribution of explanatory variables, i.e., the change in workers’ personal and 
productive characteristics, and in job characteristics. The other is the change in wage 
structure in terms of the coefficients on the various explanatory variables. In detail, following 
Machado and Mata (2005), if α(.) is some summary statistics for wages – such as the gini 
coefficient – then we can decompose the changes in α as below:  
 
     
     
     
coefficients
covariate
   (1) (0)
* (1); (0) * (0)
  * (1) * (1); (0) .
f w f w
f w X f w
f w f w X residual
 
 
 

    
   
      (2) 
 
where f(w(t)) denotes an estimator of the marginal density of w (the log wage) at t based on 
the observed sample {wi(t)}, f*(w(t)) an estimator of density of w at t based on the generated 
sample {wi*(t)}, and t=0, 1. The counterfactual densities will be denoted by f*(w(1); X(0)), 
                                                        
6 Other advantages of the quantile approach are that it is less sensitive to outliers; more robust to departures from normality 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978); and has better properties in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Deaton, 1992) 
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for the density that would result in t=1 if all covariates had their t=0 distributions, f*(w(1); 
Xi(0)), for the wage density in t=1 if only Xi (part of the covariates) were distributed as in t=0.  
 
Furthermore, the contribution of an individual covariate xi to the total wage inequality could 
be measured by looking at indicators such as 
 
         * *1 1 ; 0if w f w x  .                      (3) 
 
Along the lines of Machado and Mata, we also propose to counterfactually measure the 
contribution of an individual coefficient i to the change of wage inequality by observing  
 
     * (0); (1) * (0)if w f w                          (4) 
 
where  * (0); (1)if w   denotes an estimator of density of w with all covariates at period 0 
and all coefficients but i(1) based at period 0, i(1) denotes the coefficient of xi is taken from 
period 1. With Formula (4), we then counterfactually analyse the change of wage inequality 
and wage gap caused by the specific changes in the pay structure, such as by changes in the 
returns to education, etc.  
 
In essence, Machado and Mata’s counterfactual decomposition is an extension of Oaxaca’s 
(1973) in the environment of quantile regressions. The key exercise of Machado and Mata’s 
approach is to obtain the generated sample {wi*(t)}. To get {wi*(t)}, one first needs to get 
number n of quantile regression coefficients ˆ ( )t iu  (where ui denotes the quantile point), 
and then generate a random sample of size n with replacement from the rows of X(t) denoted 
by * 1{ }
n
i tx  , and finally get 
* * '
1
ˆ{ ( ) ( ) ( )}t ni i i tw t x t u  . For details, the reader is referred to 
Machado and Mata (2005).  
 
3. Results from Quantile Regressions 
 
Figures 2 to 26 present the coefficients from quantile regressions for wages in 1988, 1995, 2002 
and 2008.  
 
Wage gaps by productive characteristics of workers 
 
In our data, there are two worker characteristics that are prima facie productive: education 
and experience. We discuss the changes in the returns to both characteristics in turn.  
 
Figure 2 confirms the overall rise in the return to education in urban China from 1988 up to 
2002 that has been previously reported (Appleton, et al. 2005; Zhang, et al. 2005). The 
plotted line for 2002 dominates that for all previous years. In general, rising returns to 
education over time leads to an increase of wage differentials - this has been observed in 
other transitions, such as those in Eastern Europe (Svejnar, 1999). However, from 2002 to 
2008, the reverse trend can be observed, with a fall in returns to education. Looking across 
the quantiles, in the first two surveys, the returns to education were higher at the lower end of 
the distribution For example, Figure 2 shows the return to education at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution reach 4% in 1988 but is less than 2% at the top end. This pattern has been 
observed in previous quantile regression analyses of wages in urban China (Knight and Song, 
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2002; Bishop, Luo and Wang, 2005). By contrast, in 2002, the returns to education fairly 
uniform across the distribution, lying in the 5-6% range. The rise in the returns to education 
from 1988 to 2002 was therefore greatest at the upper end of the distribution. The partial 
reversal of the rise in returns to education from 2002 to 2008 is also largest at the top end. 
From the 75th percentile onwards, the returns fall at an increasing rate and at the very top are 
around the 2% observed in 1988.  
 
What might explain the tendency for returns to education to be lower at the upper quantiles? 
The pattern contradicts the common assumption that education complements unobserved 
worker ability. This assumption was invoked by Buchinsky (1994) to account for the pattern 
of returns rising at upper quantiles found in his pioneering analysis of wages in the US. 
Buchinsky's explanation of the positive correlation between education returns and conditional 
wages rested on how returns varied with the unobserved characteristics of workers. To 
explain the contrary pattern in China, Knight and Song (2002) instead focused on the 
unobserved characteristics of firms. Workers at the higher end of the conditional wage 
distribution are likely to come from firms that pay more, ceteris paribus, perhaps because 
they are more profitable and share some of these rents with their workforce. In urban China, 
it was common for higher profit firms to supplement basic pay with profit-related bonuses. 
However, these bonuses were typically distributed quite evenly across their employees and 
thus not related to worker's productive characteristics such as education. Consequently, total 
wages, inclusive of bonuses, might be expected to vary more with education at the lower end 
of the distribution than at the top. This explanation may not be applicable to 2002, because 
that year comes towards the end of the period of radical urban reform and retrenchment in 
SOEs. Profitability in SOEs had fallen dramatically, so that profit related bonuses were less 
significant. What remains puzzling is why returns to education appear to plummet for the top 
end of the distribution between 2002 to 2008. One explanation which cannot be tested with 
our data is some high paid jobs could be obtained via bribery or using personal connections; a 
phenomenon is more commonly noticed and reported by the media in the past decade. This 
would show up in our decompositions as an positive unobservable effect, but may not be 
related to education. Another explanation could be that high paid jobs are mostly in 
owner-occupied firms, managerial or administrative posts or state-sectors for which education 
is not the best measure of human capital: other unobserved skills or talents may be more 
important. 
 
Figure 3 plots the returns to the other potentially productive worker characteristic, 
experience7. Contrary to the trends with education, it has often been found that the returns to 
experience fall during transition – for example, this was observed during the East European 
transitions (Svenjar, 1999). This has been explained as a consequence of pre-reform 
administered wages over-rewarding seniority. However, in urban China, the trends in returns 
to experience are less clear. The returns spike upwards from 1988 to 1995, drop sharply 
between 1995 and 2002, before rising again from 2002 to 2008. The pattern of returns has 
also become flatter across the distribution. In 1988 and to a lesser extent the next two rounds, 
the returns to experience are greater at the lower end of the conditional wage distribution. 
This may be because, as argued with education, there are fewer bonuses at the lower end of 
the distribution and such bonuses tended to be shared quite equally without regard to seniority. 
However, it might also be that it was older workers with less favourable unobserved personal 
characteristics (lower “ability”) that tended to benefit more from seniority under administered 
                                                        
7 Experience was entered as quadratic in the wage functions and exhibited the conventional inverse U-shaped pattern. Figure 
4 shows the turning point of the quadratics remained similar in 1998 and 2002, except for towards the top of the conditional 
wage distribution, where it rose.  
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pay scales. In contrast, in 2008, the returns to experience do not vary systematically across 
the distribution. Consequently, comparing the first and last round of the surveys, the returns 
to experience are lower in 2008 than 1988 for the bottom fifth of the distribution but higher 
for the rest.  
 
Wage gaps between occupations 
 
The occupations of workers in our analysis are identified as private business owners, white 
collar workers (including professional or technical workers, managers, department heads, 
clerks), blue collar workers (skilled and unskilled) and others not belonging to any of 
occupations listed previously. In our models, the white collar workers are made the reference 
group.  
 
Figure 5 shows that the earning differential between private business owners and white 
collars was almost indiscernible for most of the wage distribution in 1988. However, at 
towards the upper end of the distribution (from around the 80th percentile), private owners 
are paid slightly more. Over time, for the rest of the distribution, private owners have fallen 
behind white collar workers. By 2008, private owners in the lowest percentiles are estimated 
to earn around 5% less than white collar workers. This may reflect an increasing 
heterogeneity among private business owners. At the lower end, they will have faced 
increasing competition from migrants - most of whom are self-employed - from which white 
collar workers have been largely insulated.  
 
There was little difference between the earnings of white collar and blue collar workers in 
1988: the wage gap was less than 1% except for the very lowest paid. However, subsequent 
years have seen the gap widen in favour of white collar workers (Figure 6 refers). By 2008, 
the gap was around 3-4%. Between 2002 and 2008, the gap increased most at the upper end - 
widening by around three percentage points - and least at the lower end - where the increase 
was little more than one percentage point. It may be that the onset of the global credit crunch 
and the slow-down in exporting had a more pronounced negative impact on the better paid 
blue collar workers.  
 
Wage gaps by unproductive characteristics of workers 
 
During the period, there has been a marked rise in the pure gender gap in wages in urban 
China (Figure 8 refers). This has sometimes been observed in other transitions from 
communism, but is far from being a universal feature. Newell and Reilly (2001) survey the 
literature on East and Central European transitions, concluding that the mixed results in 
different countries means that overall transition is "broadly neutral" in its impact on the pure 
gender gap. Pham and Reilly (2007) find a fall in the gap in Vietnam in the 1990s. In the 
Chinese case, it appears that earlier in the reform period, pay scales were more equal between 
the genders and during the move to the market, there has been more freedom to pay women 
less than men8.  
 
The pattern of gender coefficients across the quantiles has also changed over time. In 1988 
and 1995, it follows something of an "L-shape". For most of the distribution, the gap in those 
                                                        
8 There may also have been selectivity effects, with women forming a smaller share of those in employment after suffering 
disproportionately from retrenchment in the second half of the 1990s (Appleton et al, 2002). However, one might expect 
these selectivity effects to lower the gender gap, as women with less favourable unobserved characteristics might have been 
more vulnerable to retrenchment.  
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years was around 7-8% but it was higher for bottom fifth, particularly in 1995. The gap 
roughly doubles to around 15% between 1995 and 2002 for the centre of the distribution. The 
plot of the gender gap for 2002 shows a generally negative slope. By 2002, the gender gap 
has increased further, to about 25% for the conditional median wage. However, the plot now 
is positively sloped. This is consistent with a “glass ceiling” effect whereby women at the 
higher end of the distribution face particular discrimination, although if so, it is a gradual and 
wide-ranging pattern rather than something which just applies to the top quantiles. 
Comparing the starting plot for 1988 with that for 2002, we can see the rise in the gender gap 
tends to somewhat greater as we move up the distribution. This is partly because there was 
already more of a gender gap at the bottom of the distribution in 1988 and partly because the 
gap becomes more pronounced at higher quantiles in 2002.  
 
Figure 9 plots the wage premium for Communist Party membership across the conditional 
wage distribution for the first three rounds of the survey: unfortunately, the last round did not 
record respondents party membership. Like the pure gender gap, the CP wage premium rises 
during transition. However, the premium is fairly uniform across the wage distribution in 
1988 (albeit somewhat higher at the very top) but in later years increases disproportionately 
at the lower end of the distribution. It is sometimes argued that CP membership signals high 
underlying productivity and this - rather than any discrimination in favour of party members - 
explains the wage premium (Li et al., 2007). However, this is hard to reconcile with the 
finding of the quantile regression that - after 1988 - CP membership appears to be of most 
benefit to lower ability workers - those at the lower end of the conditional wage distribution. 
Bishop, Luo and Wang (2005) suggest that party membership plays a particular role in 
signalling ability among low earnings workers (who typically lack the educational certificates 
more conventionally thought to signal ability). 
 
The other non-productive characteristic is ethnicity. Figure 10 plots the coefficients for being 
non-Han Chinese. Wage gaps by ethnicity are modest in 1988, being only one or two 
percentage points and vary little across the quantiles. However, the gaps for 2008 are larger 
and more varied. Wage gaps are only unfavourable to ethnic minorities in the bottom half of 
the distribution and can become large, exceeding 25% at the 25% percentile. 
 
 
Wage gaps by ownership structure 
 
We now turn to the effects on wages of job characteristics, starting with the ownership type of 
the enterprise in which they work. The default category is state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
with dummy variables being used for other types: urban collective; private; foreign owned or 
joint venture; and "other". The "other" category is sizable only from 2002 and refers to the 
newly emerging types of ownership whereby firms were listed on the stock market. Typically, 
this type had mixed ownership - sometimes with the state retaining a dominant share. During 
the period, there is a marked shift in the share of workers employed in different ownership 
types. Less than 1% of workers in 1988 were employed in privately owned companies, rising 
to a fifth of workers in 2002 and over a third in 2008. There was also strong growth in 
employment in foreign owned or joint venture companies, and in the “other” category. 
Conversely, the share of employment in SOEs falls, from over three quarters in 1988 and 
1995 to less than a half in 2008. Employment in urban collectives also falls, from 20% in 
1988 to 5% in 2008.  
 
Figures 11-14 show the "pure" wage gaps between the various ownership sectors and the 
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default SOE sector. Over time, pay in the urban collective sector has tended to fall further 
behind that in SOEs. By contrast, pay in the emerging ownership sectors (private, foreign and 
other) has risen relative to that in SOEs. As well as shifts in pay differentials by ownership, 
there have been changes in how these vary across the distribution. In 1988, the wage 
premiums for working in an SOE compared to the various types of non-SOEs were greatest at 
the bottom end of the distribution but sharply diminished as one moves up the distribution. 
Indeed, at the higher ends of the wage distribution, SOEs paid less ceteris paribus than 
private or foreign enterprises. This suggests that lower paid workers may have preferred 
employment in SOEs, where they would have enjoyed a wage premium, but higher skilled 
workers were better rewarded elsewhere. However, by 2008, the differentials by ownership 
type were generally much flatter and more uniform across the distribution of wages. A 
possible explanation for this is that, during the transition, pay in the SOE sector has become 
less egalitarian and more sensitive to productivity so that there is a closer match to the 
patterns observed in private and foreign owned/joint venture firms.  
 
 
Wage gaps between industrial sectors 
 
Industrial sectors are classified into 12 categories with manufacturing set as the reference 
group9. Figures 15-25 plot the coefficients on the dummy variables for the various industrial 
sectors, showing the pure wage gap between workers employed in them and those in 
manufacturing. Manufacturing is set as the reference group because it was by far the biggest 
sector in terms of employment in 1988 employing 43% of workers, with the second largest, 
wholesale and retail trade, employing only 14%. By 2008, manufacturing had shrunk in 
relative terms, employing only 17% of workers, whereas trade has expanded to cover 21%. 
Typically manufacturing pays more than trade, given worker characteristics. Figure 18 shows 
that the gap was modest in 1988, being less than 5%. However, the gap has widened over 
time, especially among the bottom 30% of the distribution.  
 
The third largest sector in 2008 in terms of employment is public utilities and real estate. If 
we compare the wage gap for 2008 with that for 1988, the story is somewhat similar to that 
for trade in that the gap widens to further favour manufacturing for much of the distribution. 
However, for the top third of the distribution, the gap narrows and at the highest quantile is 
close to zero. 
 
When we look at wage differentials with other tertiary sectors, the general trend has been the 
erosion of the privileged position of manufacturing workers. Ceteris paribus, workers in the 
civil service, in finance, in education, in social welfare and in science were paid less relative 
to manufacturing workers in 1988. By 2008, this differential had been reversed. There is 
some tendency for the improvement in the relative pay of these sectors to be proportionally 
larger, the further up the distribution we look. This is most apparent when comparing 
government civil servants with manufacturing workers: The wage gap between these two 
sectors is the same in 1988 and 2008 among bottom 10%, but progressively widens as we 
move along the distribution - reaching more than 20% towards the end. 
 
                                                        
9 There are (1) primary (including agriculture, forestry, herding, fishing and mining); (2) manufacturing; (3) construction; (4) 
transportation and communication; (5) commerce (whole sale and retailing); (6) public utilities and real estate (water, gas 
and electricity supply, real estate, social service); (7) social welfare (health, sports and the like); (8) education and media 
(education, culture and arts, broadcasting, film and television); (9) sciences and research (scientific research, water control, 
geological investigation); (10) financial sector; (11) government administration; (12) other not belonging to any sector listed 
above. 
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With the remaining industries - primary industry, construction and transport and 
communications - there were no sizable wage differentials relative to manufacturing in 1988 
but by 2008, gaps in favour of those industries had appeared. 
 
One factor that may underlie some of these changes in pay between sectors is the increase of 
rural-urban migration during the period. Rural-urban migrants have tended to be concentrated 
in certain industrial sectors – such as manufacturing and particularly trade - more than others. 
This increase in competition may have created more of a moderating pressure on the wages 
of urban residents in those sectors with significant numbers of migrants and so affected 
differentials with unaffected sectors. 
 
 
4. Decomposing the change in wage inequality  
 
After conducting the quantile analysis, we are now able to use the regression results to help 
explain the widening-up of wage gaps in urban China. As discussed in Section 2, the change 
of wage inequality can be counterfactually decomposed into that attributable to changes in 
the covariates of the quantile regressions and that which is attributable to changes in the wage 
structure (Machado and Mata, 2005). As part of the former, we investigate the impact of 
changes in worker's personal productive, unproductive and job characteristics contribute to 
the variation of wage inequality. As part of the latter, we look at the impact on wage 
inequality of changes in the pay structure, as represented by the shifts in the coefficients of 
explanatory variables such as sex, education, etc.  
 
Table 3 reports the results of decomposing the Gini index for wages using three intervals 
between the CHIP survey rounds. As shown in Table 1 and discussed in Section 2, wage 
increased during the period with the Gini index rising from 0.237 in 1988 to 0.45 in 2008. 
The rise in the Gini index for wages was fairly equally divided between the first interval, 
1988 to 1995 and the last, 2002-2008; it did not change appreciably in the middle interval, 
1995-2002. Table 3 shows that most of the rise in wage inequality was attributable to changes 
in the wage structure - to the changes in coefficients discussed previously in Section 3. 
Changes in the covariates had no aggregate effect on inequality from 1988 to 1995 and 
accounted for only 0.016 (16%) of the 0.102 rise in the Gini index from 2002 to 2008. The 
covariates also implied a slight increase in inequality in 1995-2002, but this was largely offset 
by a negative residual in the decomposition. To understand these results more fully, we 
consider the contribution of specific factors to the decomposition, beginning with the 
productive characteristics of workers. 
 
 
Changes in inequality and worker characteristics  
 
Changes in wage differentials by education are often thought to be key drivers of changes in 
inequality. However, the pattern in urban China varies over each of the three survey intervals. 
From 1988 to 1995, as shown in Figure 2, the returns to education shifted upwards across the 
distribution with somewhat larger increases at the bottom. Consequently, this did not 
contribute the rise in inequality. By contrast, from 1995 to 2002, the increase in returns to 
education was much larger at the upper end of the conditional distribution. The 
decomposition implies that this would have increased the Gini coefficient by 0.034. From 
2002 to 2008, returns fell across the board but plummeted for the highest paid workers and 
hence the decomposition implies, ceteris paribus, this would have reduced the Gini 
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coefficient by 0.06. Changes in the amount of education, as opposed to their returns, tended 
to lower inequality in all three intervals but these effects were modest. 
 
Changes in the returns to experience had qualitatively similar effects to changes in the returns 
to education. Less well paid workers gained the most from the initial rise in returns to 
experience from 1988 to 1995, which would have reduced inequality. Conversely, they were 
hardest hit by the fall in returns to experience from 1995 to 2002 - a trend which, ceteris 
paribus, would have increased the Gini coefficient by 0.041. Rises in the returns to 
experience from 2002 to 2005 were greatest for the higher quartiles, further increasing 
inequality. The gradual aging of the workforce, and associated increase in its experience, 
tended to slightly reduce inequality in the first two intervals - which the returns to experience 
were higher for the lower quartiles - but then increase it from 2002-2008, which higher 
quartiles enjoyed the highest returns to experience. 
 
Now we look at other personal factors such as sex, Communist Party (CP) membership and 
minority status. While the increased gender wage gap has worsened inequality between men 
and women, its impact on overall inequality over time is nuanced. It is only in the last 
interval, 2002 to 2008, that it appears to have markedly increased the Gini coefficient - 
implying an increase of 0.017, which accounts for 17% of the overall rise in inequality. 
Figure 5 suggests that this is because the rise in the gender gap in the earlier two intervals 
was greater at the lower end of the wage distribution. By contrast, from 2002 to 2008, the gap 
changes little at the bottom end but increases greatly for higher quartiles.  
 
The rise in the Communist Party wage premium has not large effects on overall wage 
inequality. The decomposition shows a small negative effect on the Gini in 1988-1995, as the 
rise was greater at the lower end of the distribution and indeed the premium fell for the top 
third of workers. But this was almost entirely reversed in 1995-2002. Changes in the wage 
gap of minority workers relative to Han Chinese workers has not had an appreciable effect on 
the Gini coefficient. 
 
 
Changes in inequality and job characteristics  
 
Table 2 documents large changes in employment by ownership, with the contraction of urban 
collectives and SOEs, and the emergence of private, foreign and "other" (i.e. mixed) forms of 
ownership. However, Table 3 reveals the impact of these changes on inequality to be rather 
modest. It is only in the middle interval, 1995 to 2002, that there is a discernible effect: 
implying an increase of 0.012 in the Gini coefficient. This would have led to an increase in 
equality but for the offsetting negative residual item in the decomposition for that period. 
Changes in wage differentials by ownership initially had little impact on the change in 
inequality, but did contribute to rising inequality from 2002 to 2008 - accounting for an 
estimated 18% of the overall rise.  
 
The widening wage gap between blue and white collar workers also contributed to the rise in 
inequality. During the first interval, 1988 to 1995, it implied a 0.012 increase in the Gini 
coefficient (11% of the overall rise). There was no change in the wage gap from 1995 to 2002  
but the in the last period, 2002-2008, the further increase in this occupational wage gap 
accounted for about 9% of the rise in inequality in this period. 
 
Changes in wage differentials by industry also tended to raise overall inequality. The effects 
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were small from 1988 to 1995, but increased thereafter. In 1995 to 2002, they increased the 
Gini by 0.011 ceteris paribus; in 2002-2008, the contribution rose further to 0.026, a full 
quarter of the overall increase in the inequality. Figure 24, on the wage gap between civil 
servants and manufacturing workers provides some insight into this. In 2002, the gap was 
fairly even across the distribution, falling somewhat as we move up the quantiles. By contrast, 
in 2008, the gap sharply rises as we move up the distribution and thus has an unequalising 
effect.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper uses quantile analysis to make three broad contributions to the literature on the 
determinants of earnings and inequality in urban China. First, it updates the literature with 
results from the Chinese Household Income Project for the past decade. Second, it tracks the 
evolution of the wage differentials across the entire distribution of wages rather than merely 
focusing at the mean or median. Third, it identifies how these changes in the wage structure – 
and to a lesser extent the profile of employment – have led to rising inequality.  
 
In terms of the first contribution, while the period 2002 to 2008 has seen a renewal of the rise 
in wage inequality observed from 1988 to 1995, there have been some reversals in other 
trends. For example, the returns to education and experience fell in this interval, as did the 
wages of workers in private and foreign owned firms relative to those in state owned 
enterprises. By contrast, the gender gap continued to rise, as did the gap between white collar 
and blue collar workers, and between manufacturing and most other industrial sectors. 
 
As for the second contribution, tracking changes across the entire distribution of wages, it is 
clear that changes are seldom uniform for all quantiles, but are often complex and variable 
across the different survey intervals. This provides justification for the quantile regression 
based methods used here and the detailed examination of each survey year. Simplistic 
assumptions or generalisation rarely match the patterns observed in the data. For example, it 
is often assumed that returns to education rise with unobserved ability, but we find opposite 
that: returns to education were initially higher for those with unfavourable unobservables - 
the low quantiles. By 2002, this pattern has all but been eroded before showing signs of 
emerging again in 2008.  
 
Finally, on the third contribution, the Machado and Mata decomposition suggests that 
changes in the wage structure have played the dominant role in explaining the rise in 
inequality in urban China. Changes in worker or job characteristics play a comparatively 
minor role. In the most recent period, 2002 to 2008, changes in the returns to education and 
experience have actually been equalising. However, ever other category of observed wage 
differential - by sex, occupation, ownership, industrial sector and province – has served to 
widened inequality.  
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Table 1: Urban Wage Inequality 
 
 1988 1995 2002 2008 
Percentile ratios     
p90/p10 2.82                     5.04                  4.96                  6.43
p75/p25 1.65 2.17 2.29 2.59 
p90/p50 1.57 1.99 2.08 2.63 
P50/p10 1.80 2.54 2.38 2.45 
Skewness 7.16 11.09 4.32 10.62 
QSK 5% - 95% 0.47 1.03 1.46 2.71 
QSK 10% - 90% 0.28 0.63 0.87 1.76 
QSK 25% - 75% 0.12 0.30 0.26 0.56 
Gini coefficient 0.237 0.345 0.348 0.450 
General entropy     
GE(-1)                   0.238  0.576  0.286  0.420  
GE(0) 0.108  0.235  0.212  0.347  
GE(1) 0.108  0.226  0.215  0.440  
GE(2) 0.148  0.379  0.297  1.126  
Atkinson index         
A(0.5)              0.051  0.106  0.101  0.175  
A(1)   0.102  0.210  0.191  0.293  
A(2) 0.322  0.535  0.364  0.457  
No. of observations 17733 12245 10133 6947 
Sources: calculated from the CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2008 urban household surveys. 
 
The measure of quantile-based skewness (QSK) is a ratio of the upper spread to the lower spread minus 
one: QSK(p) = [(Q(1-p)-Q(.5))/(Q(.5)-Q(p))]-1 for p < 0.5. The quantity QSK(p) is re-centred using 
subtraction of one, so that it takes the value zero for a symmetric distribution. A value greater than zero 
indicates right-skewness and a value less than zero indicates left-skewness.  
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Figure 11. Wage Gap of Collective Firms vs SOEs
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Figure 13. Wage Gap of Foreign Firms vs SOEs 
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Figure 15. Wage Gap of Primary Industry vs Manufacturing 
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Figure 21. Wage Gap of Education & Media vs Manufacturing
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Figure 23. Wage Gap of Financial Industry vs Manufacturing
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Table 2: Personal and job characteristics of the workers (%) 
 
 1988 1995 2002 2008 
Male 52.23 52.58 55.55 56.23 
CP members 23.47 24.51 28.81 n.a. 
Minority 3.77 4.30 4.10 1.11% 
Education in years 10.04 10.73 11.46 10.51 
Age in years 37.10 38.56 40.45 39.50 
Experience in years 21.06 21.83 22.99 33.50 
Ownership structure     
SOEs 77.67 79.04 64.76 49.59 
Urban collective 20.28 15.06 6.86 5.30 
Private ownership 0.77 1.65 20.72 33.81 
Foreign owned or Joint venture 0.36 1.27 2.17 6.90 
Other ownership 0.92 2.98 5.49 4.40 
Occupation     
Private business owners 1.21 1.47 4.63 8.67 
White collar 45.42 52.83 51.63 51.19 
Blue collar 52.76 37.44 40.47 34.00 
Other occupations 0.60 8.26 3.27 6.15 
Industrial sectors     
Primary 4.13 2.65 2.78 1.60 
Manufacturing 42.72 39.86 24.96 16.80 
Construction 3.41 2.87 3.23 3.89 
Transportation and comm. 6.74 4.86 7.77 13.19 
Wholesale and retail 14.41 14.23 12.20 20.50 
Public utilities and real estate 2.45 3.81 14.65 16.53 
Social welfare 4.55 4.39 5.07 6.55 
Education and media 7.21 7.11 8.96 5.43 
Sciences and research 2.89 2.27 2.56 2.36 
Financial sector 1.53 1.92 2.67 3.60 
Government 8.42 11.32 11.91 9.31 
Other industries 1.52 4.71 3.25 0.26 
 
 
Sources: calculated from the CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2008 urban household survey. 
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Table 3: Decomposition of the changes in the wage distribution (start years used as base years) 
 
 1988-1995 1995-2002 2002-2008 
Change in Gini 0.108 0.003 0.102 
Aggregate contributions to the change in Gini  
Covariates 0.000 (-0.013, 0.021) 
0.013 
(-0.005, 0.040) 
0.016 
(-0.018, 0.003) 
Coefficients 0.121 (0.111, 0.135) 
0.002 
(-0.009, 0.010) 
0.092 
(0.075, 0.116) 
Residual 
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.006 
 
Contribution of covariates to change in Gini  
Sex -0.002 (-0.006, 0.000) 
-0.002 
(-0.006, 0.003) 
-0.001 
(-0.004, 0.003) 
CP membership 
-0.003 
(-0.004, -0.001) 
-0.002 
(-0.003, 0.000) 
N.A. 
Minority 0.000 (0.000, 0.001) 
0.000 
(-0.001, 0.005) 
0.000 
(0.000, 0.000) 
Education -0.001 (-0.005, 0.003) 
-0.005 
(-0.010, 0.005) 
-0.009 
(-0.018, -0.003) 
Experience -0.003 (-0.007, -0.004) 
-0.002 
(-0.010, 0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004, 0.010) 
Occupation 0.000 (-0.005, 0.005) 
0.001 
(-0.007, 0.020) 
0.005 
(-0.003, 0.013) 
Ownership 0.000 (-0.006, 0.003) 
0.012 
(0.007, 0.018) 
0.000 
(-0.017, 0.012) 
Industrial sector 0.001 (-0.008, 0.009) 
-0.001 
(-0.008, 0.005) 
0.001 
(-0.004, 0.010) 
Provinces -0.003 (-0.012,0.010) 
0.002 
(-0.013, 0.024) 
0.006 
(-0.015, 0.020) 
Contribution of coefficients to the change in Gini  
Sex -0.002 (-0.003, 0.002) 
-0.000 
(-0.002, 0.001) 
0.017 
(0.014, 0.019) 
CP membership -0.004 (-0.006, -0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002, 0.003) N.A. 
Minority 0.001 (0.000, 0.005) 
-0.001 
(-0.002, 0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000, 0.001) 
Education -0.002 (-0.004, 0.001) 
0.034 
(-0.030, 0.040) 
-0.060 
(-0.063, -0.054) 
Experience -0.019 (-0.022, -0.016) 
0.041 
(0.037, 0.044) 
-0.013 
(0.009, 0.020) 
Occupation  0.012 (0.011, 0.015) 
-0.003 
(-0.004, -0.002) 
0.009 
(0.003, 0.012) 
Ownership 0.003 (0.000, 0.005) 
0.001 
(-0.001, 0.005) 
0.018 
(0.009, 0.033) 
Industrial sector 0.003 (-0.008, 0.011) 
0.011 
(0.006, 0.026) 
0.026 
(0.018, 0.045) 
Provinces 0.016 (0.009,0.025) 
-0.016 
(-0.020, -0.011) 
0.029 
(0.016,0.35) 
Constants 0.155 (0.147, 0.165) 
-0.054 
(-0.060, -0.046) 
0.378 
(0.300, 0.464) 
 
Note: (1) The change in the Gini coefficient is the mean of 10 times replication of the simulation with the 
coefficients from quantile regressions and 999 random sample drawn from the variable data sets with 
replacement. During each simulation, once the random samples are drawn, they will be used throughout 
the simulation. (2) The maximum and minimum values of the 10 times replication is shown in the bracket. 
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